A key establishment protocol allows entities to establish a common secret key to ensure secure communications over an insecure public network. This paper proposes two new twoparty key agreement protocols. Both protocols do not involve bilinear pairings. The first protocol is a certificate-based key agreement protocol that is more efficient than [1] due to its dependence on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and the second is an extension to a certificateless key agreement protocol. Both protocols depend on the use of an authentication message to check that the shared session key is equal for both entities before using it. This authentication message prevents the key off-set attack that is valid for the Haiyan-Sun protocol [2] . The security analysis of the second protocol is discussed. The proposed certificateless key agreement protocol is compared with other protocols in literature [2, 3, 4] and it requires minimal computational cost. Moreover, this protocol is implemented using the Mathematica (7) program.
INTRODUCTION
Public key cryptography has become the traditional way to realize network and information security. The problem of certificate management in a traditional public key infrastructure arises from needing a trusted certification authority to issue a certificate binding the identity and the public key of an entity. Shamir proposed a new public key paradigm called identity-based public key cryptography [5] to overcome this problem. However, identity-based public key cryptography requires a trusted key generation center (KGC) to generate a private key for each entity. So, we are confronted with the key escrow problem. Fortunately, the two problems in traditional public key infrastructure and identitybased public key cryptography can be prohibited by introducing certificateless public key cryptography [6] , which can be conceived as an intermediate structure between traditional public key infrastructure and identity-based cryptography. The first certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol appears in the seminal paper by AlRiyami and Paterson (2003) [6] .
Some early certificateless key exchange protocols (2005 till 2010) [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] have been proposed with heuristic security analysis. These protocols involve bilinear pairings and the pairing is regarded as a computationally expensive operation. The relative computation cost of a pairing is approximately twenty times higher than that of the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [14] . Therefore, the certificateless key agreement protocols without bilinear pairings would be more appealing in terms of efficiency. Recently, several certificateless key exchange protocols without pairing have been proposed in (2009 till 2011) [15] [16] [17] [18] . However, Yang et al. [17] (2011) pointed out that both of Geng et al.'s protocol [15] (2009) and Hou et al.'s protocol [16] (2009) are not secure. They proposed an improved certificateless key agreement protocol. He et al. [18] (2011) also proposed a certificateless key agreement protocol without pairing. In (2011 and 2012), Debiao [4, 3] proposed two certificateless key agreement protocols without pairings. In 2013, HaiyanSun [2] proposed another two-party key agreement protocol without pairings.
In this paper, the weakness of Haiyan-Sun protocol, which is its susceptibility to the key off-set attack is demonstrate. Also, two new key agreement protocols are proposed; the first is a two-party certificate-based key agreement protocol and the second is a certificateless two-party key agreement protocol. Both protocols are based on elliptic curve cryptography.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the preliminaries. In section three, the security properties of a two-party key agreement protocol are provided. Section four introduces an overview of Haiyan-Sun protocol. Section five presents the first of the proposed protocols followed by the proposed certificateless key agreement protocol in section six. Section seven covers the security analysis and a comparative study of the proposed certificateless protocol followed by the implementation in section eight. Finally, section nine concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Notations
In this subsection, the notations used in this paper are introduced. 
G is a cyclic additive group in the point addition " " defined as follows: 
. Let the order of G be n . The following problems are commonly used in the security analysis of many cryptographic protocols [4, 19] . 
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem

Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem
Given a generator P of G and
, the solution of the DDH problem is to decide whether the equation cP abP holds.
Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem
Given a generator P of G and ; and answers 0, otherwise.
The GDH assumption states that the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve the GDH problem is negligible.
SECURITY PROPERTIES FOR TWO-PARTY AUTHENTICATED KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOLS
The following security properties are commonly required for two-party authenticated key agreement protocols [19, 20] :
Known Key Security (KKS)
Each run of a key agreement protocol between two parties A and B should produce a unique session key. A protocol should not become insecure if the adversary has learned some of the previous session keys.
The Key off-set attack (KOA)
An adversary can off-set the agreed session key by an exponent  , which is unknown to both A and B
Resistance to Disclosure of Ephemeral Secrets (DES)
The protocol should be resistant to the disclosure of ephemeral secrets. The disclosure of an ephemeral secret should not compromise the security of other sessions.
Partial (or Weak) Forward Secrecy (WFS)
An attacker who knows the private keys of all parties, but is not actively involved in choosing ephemeral keys during the sessions of interest, should not be able to determine previously established session keys.
Resistance to Key-Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Attacks
If the private key of a user A is compromised, the attacker should not be able to impersonate another user B to A.
No key control (NKC)
Both participants A and B have an input into the session key neither participant can force the full session key to be a preselected value.
Resistance to Unknown Key-Share (UKS) Attacks
It should be impossible to coerce A into thinking it is sharing a key with B, when it is actually sharing a key with another (honest) user C (and C correctly thinks the key is shared with A).
OVERVIEW ON HAIYAN SUN[1] PROTOCOL 4.1 Set up
This algorithm takes a security parameter k as an input and returns the system parameters and the master secret key. Given k, the KGC does the following steps. 1) The security center chooses a k-bit prime p and determines the tuple 
Partial -Private -Key -Extract
This algorithm takes a master key, a user's identifier, system parameters as inputs, and returns the user's ID-based private key. The KGC does the following steps.
1) KGC chooses a random number
to the rs through a secret channel. The user's partial private key is i s , the user checks his secret key validation by testing the equation
The private key is valid if the equation holds.
Set-Secret-Value
The user with i ID picks randomly
and sets i x as his secret value.
Set-Public-Key
The user with identity i ID has the public key as
P the public key
Key Agreement
Suppose that A and B want to establish a session key, they perform the following steps: 
and its session key
Both entities A and B are supposed to compute the same session key.
Weakness on Haiyan Sun[2] Protocol
The key off-set attack (KOA) is defined by Blake-Wilson [21] as follows: an adversary can off-set the agreed session key by an exponent  , which is unknown to both A and B.
All the key agreement protocols [2, 3, 4, 19] without key confirmation are vulnerable to this attack. From the attack, the adversary does not gain any knowledge about the agreed session key, but two entities generate a wrong session key. This is a violation of the key integrity property which indicates that any accepted session key should depend only on inputs from the protocol participants. Now, in Figure 1 , how this attack works in Haiyan Sun's protocol is demonstrated.
THE PROPOSED ELLIPTIC CURVE KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
The proposed protocol consists of three phases: the registration phase, the transfer phase and the key generation phase. The proposed protocol is described in Figure 2 . 
The Registration Phase
K P . x . x P . a . b P . x T . b K      . Also P . a . b K P . b . a T . a K 2 BA B 2 AB     ,
THE PROPOSED CERTIFICATELESS KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section, the above proposed key agreement protocol is extended to be an identity based key agreement protocol. The proposed identity based protocol consists of six polynomial time algorithms. They are described as follows. The proposed protocol described in figure 3.
Set up
This algorithm takes a security parameter k as an input and returns the system parameters and the master secrete key. Given k KGC does the following steps.
1) The security center chooses a k -bit prime p and determines the tuple 
). 
Partial -Private -Key -Extract
This algorithms takes master key , a user's identifier, system parameters as inputs , and returns the user's ID-based private key. KGC does the following steps. 
1) KGC chooses a random number
Set-Private-Key
The user with identity i ID has the secrete key pair 
Key -Agreement
The agreed session key can be computed as
SECURITY ANALYSIS 7.1 Known Key Security (KKS)
In the proposed protocol both entities A and B computes the session key as follow: and therefore, user A rejects the session key agreement and sends an authentication-failed message to B. Thus, the key off-set attack is not possible against the proposed protocol.
Resistance to Disclosure of Ephemeral Secrets (DES)
If any session key is exposed to an attacker it does not mean that other session keys are also exposed. In the proposed protocol, the agreed session key sk depends on two random ephemeral secrets b , a and these are generated in each session. The only way to derive a and b is from A T and B T but due to the difficulties of ECDLP problem , it is impossible. So driving one session key does not allow the attacker to gain the knowledge about other session keys.
Perfect Forward Secrecy(WPFS)
If the attacker compromise the secret keys of A and B , he cannot recover any past session keys. 
No key control (NKC)
In the proposed protocol, both participants A and B have an input into the session key neither participant can force the full session key to be a preselected value. The session key in our protocol is determined jointly by both participants A and B. 
Resistance to Unknown Key-Share (UKS) Attacks
Following the proposed protocol, the session key is generated not only using 
The Comparative Study
The proposed identity based key agreement protocol is compared with the protocols by Debiao He [4] (2011) , Debiao He [3] (2012) and Haiyan Sun [2] (2013) from the computational cost , number of exchanged messages and the key offset attack where T EC-mult is the time required for executing multiplication operation on elliptic curve E, T EC-add is the time required for executing addition operation on elliptic curve E and T h is the time required for executing one way dispersed row function operation. Table 1 specify this comparative study in details.
